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The plague, which the Board of Health had feared might enter with
the German troops into the Milanese, had entered it indeed,
as is well known; and it is likewise well known, that it paused not
here, but invaded and ravaged a great part of Italy. (A. Manzoni,
The Bethrothed, 1826)
Perhaps the most intimate relationship between the
environment and the development of the vertebrate
species is the interaction of the immune system with
infectious disease agents. This is best exempliﬁed by
antigenic variations that occur in infectious disease agents
such as viral peptides and the corresponding plasticity of
the host to recognize the new variant in order to survive.
This constant battle between host and parasite has
occupied the minds of scientists from a number of
disciplines not only including immunologists but also
evolutionary biologists. It is hypothesized that the ﬁne
components of our innate and acquired immune systems
have evolved by such environmental pressures some of
which have translated into beneﬁcial outcomes and others
to debilitating chronic diseases and others yet to death.
The beneﬁcial outcomes clearly outweigh the negatives as
evidenced by the mere survival of the human species. The
debilitating outcomes are manifest by the ever increasing
rise in chronic urban diseases such as asthma or
autoimmune diseases and those leading to death include
conditions such as acquired immunodeﬁciency syndrome
(AIDS), or Ebola haemorragic fever. The recent
appearance of the severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) is the latest amongst these challenges for the
human immune system. These illnesses may be seen as a
“race” for evolution between mutualistic partners, one of
which is represented by humans. The evolution rates of the
partners are always asymmetric for reasons peculiar to
each and every interaction (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979).
As a consequence of these factors, however, it is now
accepted that coevolutionary processes always favor the
rapid rate of evolution, as stated by the Red Queen theory
(Bergstrom and Lachmann, 2003). This explains why,
in the challenge against SARS or other emerging
infectious diseases, research will be the key element to
the “ﬁnal victory.”
EMERGING DISEASES AND SARS
According to a retrospective study by the Center for
Disease Control (CDC) involving case reports during the
year 1992 from four U.S. counties located in California,
Oregon, Minnesota, and Connecticut, as many as 14% of
deaths occurred in people 1–49 years old without an
underlying medical condition may have been due to
infectious causes (Perkins et al., 1996). This observation
takes on added signiﬁcance because in the latter quarter of
the last century, a number of new infectious agents and
diseases have been identiﬁed, including, among others,
Legionnaires’ disease (Winn, 1988), Lyme’s disease
(Burgdorfer, 2001), the human immunodeﬁciency virus
(HIV) (Montagnier, 2002), the hepatitis C virus (HCV)
(Purcell, 1993), and, more recently, the hantavirus
responsible for a new pulmonary syndrome (Hawes and
Seabolt, 2003) and the Nipah virus outbreak in South East
Asia (Lam and Chua, 2002).
Although some of these diseases, i.e. Legionnaires’
disease and Lyme’s Borrelliosis are treated with
antibiotics, new and untreatable pathology is constantly
emerging, because of human intrusions into newer
ecological surroundings, international transportation
advances, and the evolution of organisms by spontaneous
and/or induced mutations or recombinations leading to the
potential to cross species barriers. Ironically, the evolution
of new etiological agents of disease are reminiscent of the
Japanese art of Origami with new patterns and images
formed at each and every turn. In such situations,
clinicians and researchers face the challenge of deﬁning
etiological agents, establishing assays for rapid diagnosis,
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SARS is the latest of these infectious challenges
(Outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome—world-
wide, 2003). Indeed, SARS appears as the ﬁrst severe and
easily transmissible new disease to emerge in the 21st
century; it is associated with a signiﬁcant morbidity and
mortality, thus making it a challenge for clinicians and
researchers worldwide. As of April 18th, 2003 over 3400
patients have been diagnosed with the disease (with
almost 200 deaths) in 25 countries across all ﬁve
continents; this may be just the tip of the iceberg as the
number of cases in China may be inaccurate.
Major outbreaks of SARS were initially reported in
some provinces of the People’s Republic of China (both
mainland and Hong Kong; Acute respiratory syndrome.
China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
China, and Viet Nam, 2003; Tsang et al., 2003), as well
as in Singapore (Outbreak of severe acute respiratory
syndrome—worldwide, 2003), Hanoi (Vietnam)
(Outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome—world-
wide, 2003), and Canada (Poutanen et al., 2003).
The clusters in Toronto, Canada, and Hong Kong, in
which the index cases apparently stayed on the same ﬂoor
of the same hotel, together with the high number of
healthcare workers that became infected, made the
hypothesis of an environmental non-infectious cause
unlikely after the ﬁrst reports were known. Several
measures were proposed to limit the spread of the disease
(Table I). Despite such measures, SARS continues to
spread. In the United States, so far, over two hundred
suspected cases in 34 states have been reported, with no
lethal case observed (CDC reports as of April 17th, 2003).
Some of the specimens found positive for the suspected
viral agent were from US patients (Ksiazek et al., 2003).
However, until a clear deﬁnition of SARS is established,
the number of actual cases will be unreliable.
Major problems stand in the way of limiting the spread
of disease. First, SARS has spread throughout the world
along international air travel routes. Thus, individuals
may travel during an incubation period and become
symptomatic only later. Second, as the number of cases
increases, it is becoming harder to identify some of the
risk factors involved in the infection, thus making
the tracking of previous contacts more difﬁcult. Third,
the potential of a vector that can transmit this disease
(whether alive or not) has yet to be entertained. Fourth, the
ﬁrst SARS cases were in November 2002, buttherewas no
warning by the Chinese government (Acute respiratory
syndrome. China, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China, and Viet Nam, 2003) causing a tragic
delay in control measures.
Various laboratory based diagnostic methods have been
used for the detection of a responsible agent, including
light and electron microscopy, immunohistochemistry,
cell culture isolation, serology, and molecular techniques.
These studies have led to the identiﬁcation of a viral agent
in a signiﬁcant fraction of infected patients (from different
SARS clusters and by different laboratories), which was
not detected in geographically matched healthy controls
(Drosten et al., 2003; Ksiazek et al., 2003; Peiris et al.,
2003), thus denoting an element of speciﬁcity. The virus
belongs to the Coronavirus family although it appears to
be signiﬁcantly different from any known members of the
same family so far described based on the entire
nucleotide sequence which has recently been determined
(Drosten et al., 2003; Ksiazek et al., 2003; Peiris et al.,
2003). It must be stressed, however, that this virus has
been identiﬁed in most but not all patients diagnosed with
SARS thus failing to exclude the co-occurrence of some
other infectious agent, as suggested by some evidence
(Drosten et al.,2003), or the presence of a diverse group of
Coronavirus. Nonetheless, a recent press release suggests
that a SARS-like disease has been experimentally induced
in monkeys infected with the same organism (Altman,
2003), thus fulﬁlling Koch’s postulate.
The Coronaviruses family is known to have a very
narrow host range, each of them infecting one or just a few
species. Known human pathogens belonging to this group
include viruses responsible for the common cold in small
seasonal outbreaks (Makela et al., 1998). A method to
mutate the spike glycoprotein of some Coronaviruses has
been recently described that allows the naturally
irreversible crossing of host cell species barriers
(Kuo et al., 2000; Haijema et al., 2003). The hypothesis
that this newly identiﬁed virus might be the result of wet
bench laboratory experiments in this direction is clearly
cause for concern but no evidence has yet been found to
support this view; on the other hand, such data raise new
TABLE I CDC guidelines for the management of patients diagnosed
with SARS (available at URL http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/
ic-closecontacts.htm)
Patients should limit interactions outside the home and should not go to
work, school, out-of-home child care, or other public areas until 10 days
after the resolution of fever, provided respiratory symptoms are absent or
improving.
During the same time, infection control precautions should be used to
minimize the potential for transmission.
† All members of a household with a SARS patient should carefully
follow recommendations for hand hygiene (e.g. frequent hand was-
hing or use of alcohol-based hand rubs), particularly after contact
with body ﬂuids (e.g. respiratory secretions, urine, or feces).
† Use of disposableglovesshould be consideredfor any direct contact
with body ﬂuids of a SARS patient.
† If possible, a SARS patient should wear a surgical mask during
close contact with uninfected persons. When a SARS patient is
unable to wear a surgical mask, household members should wear
surgical masks when in close contact with the patient.
† Sharing of eating utensils, towels, and bedding between SARS
patients and others should be avoided.
† Household waste soiled with body ﬂuids of SARS patients,
including facial tissues and surgical masks, may be discarded as
normal waste.
† Household members and other close contacts of SARS patients
should be actively monitored by the local health department and
should be vigilant for the development of fever or respiratory
symptoms and, if these develop, should seek healthcare evaluation.
However, at this time, in the absence of fever or respiratory
symptoms, household members or other close contacts of SARS
patients do not need to limit their activities outside the home.
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previously described for Coronaviruses should be
addressed for the understanding of mechanisms of
human pathogenicity. For example, only a few genomic
point mutations can lead to a drastic change in the organ
trophism of the virus, thus modifying the clinical
syndrome (Ballesteros et al., 1997; Sanchez et al.,
1999); a similar process may have caused the leap from
animals into humans (Pearson, 2003). Others have
suggested that the appearance of this new agent is a result
of the high recombination rate amongst these viruses
(de Haan et al., 2002). However, data from the complete
genome sequence of the putative agent do not support this
latter hypothesis (Pearson, 2003). Finally, from a clinical
standpoint, while no clear diagnostic criteria have been
deﬁned, a list of readily recognized signs and symptoms
has been outlined by the CDC which should raise an index
of suspicion for possible diagnosis of SARS (Table II).
Nonetheless, until the etiologic factor is clearly identiﬁed
(and a true and reliable diagnostic test described), it will
be mandatory to keep a high index of suspicion for cases
that ﬁt the general criteria of SARS and to follow isolation
precautions for known cases.
THE CASE OF SARS
SARS has been described by the World Health
Organization (WHO) as a rapidly progressive, sometimes
fatal pneumonia that appears to have arisen from the
Guangdong province in southern China in November 2002
(Acute respiratory syndrome. China, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of China, and Viet Nam, 2003).
Accordingly, initial laboratory efforts towards the
identiﬁcation of the responsible agent were focused on a
diagnosis based on clinical symptoms and available
epidemiologic information.
Evidence collected so far (Preliminary clinical descrip-
tion of severe acute respiratory syndrome, 2003) indicates
that SARS has an incubation period spanning from 1 to 11
days and the major mode of transmission is through
droplet spread, although airborne transmission or a role for
contaminated objects cannot be ruled out at the present
time. It is accepted that patients are highly infectious
during the symptomatic phase of SARS. It is not clear, at
present, whether the infectious state is also present in
pre-symptomatic stages and/or during recovery. However,
a list of hygienic measures that should be implemented has
been described by the CDC (Table I). There is also no
current information about the potential for an asympto-
matic carrier state. There have been extraordinary efforts
already made to identify the agent, obtain viral nucleotide
sequence, establish methods to culture and grow the
potential agent, develop a reliable ELISA assay, establish
RT-PCR conditions, etc.; all made possible by well
co-ordinated studies of scientists throughout the world.
This degree of co-coperation/sharing of data is a
monumental accomplishment by the scientiﬁc community
and should be applauded. Within this context, unlike HIV
where the formulation of an effective candidate vaccine
has been a daunting task, it is reasonable to assume that a
candidate vaccine for the coronavirus agent responsible
for SARS will be a reality in the relatively near future.
This is likely because, unlike HIV, a large number of
individuals who get infected with SARS, recover from the
infection, and appear to become healthy and normal. This
evidence suggests that the body’s immune system is
capable of containing the virus. Thus, it seems reasonable
that a safe and effective vaccine in the form of a live
attenuated, recombinant, or killed vaccine may become a
reality.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on epidemiological and clinical characteristics,
SARS is the ﬁrst severe new disease of the 21st century
with worldwide epidemic potential. The mode of
transmission and its lethal potential have generated
alarm. With the notable exception of HIV/AIDS, the
new diseases that appeared during the last twenty years or
have established endemicity in new geographical areas
have features that limit their capacity to pose a major
threat to international public health. Some of these, in fact,
such as avian inﬂuenza (Horimoto and Kawaoka, 2001),
Nipah virus (Hooper and Williamson, 2000), Hendra virus
(Hooper and Williamson, 2000), Hanta virus (Hawes and
Seabolt, 2003) do not demonstrate a high rate of efﬁcient
human-to-human transmission. Other infections, such as
Escherichia coli O157:H7 (Park et al., 2001), variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (Taylor, 2002), strictly
depend on food as a vehicle of transmission. West Nile
Fever (Nedry and Mahon, 2003) and Rift Valley Fever
(Wilson, 1994) that have spread to new geographical
areas, beside requiring a vector as part of the transmission
cycle, were moreover associated with low mortality,
often in high-risk groups. Other entities, such as
TABLE II CDC deﬁnition of suspect SARS case (available at URL
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/casedeﬁnition.htm)
Respiratory illness of unknown etiology with onset since February 1st,
2003, and the following criteria
† Measured temperature $ 100.58Fo r$388C
† One or more clinical ﬁnding of respiratory illness (e.g. cough,
dyspnea, hypoxia, or radiologic ﬁnding of either pneumonia or
acute respiratory distress syndrome)
† Travel* within 10 days of onset of symptoms with documented or
suspectedcommunitytransmissionofSARS**ORclosecontact***
within 10 days of onset of symptoms with either a person with a
respiratory illness who traveled to a SARS area* or a person known
to be a suspect case.
*Travel includes transit in an airport in an area with documented or suspected
community transmission of SARS.
**People’s Republic of China (includes mainland China and Hong Kong),
Hanoi, Vietnam, and Singapore.
***Deﬁned as having cared for, having lived with, or having direct contact with
respiratory secretions or body ﬂuids of a patients suspected for SARS.
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and the imported haemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, Marburg,
and Crimean-Congo; LeDuc, 1989) did not signiﬁcantly
spread from the original strong geographical foci.
The Ebola fever, in particular, raised major concerns as
some outbreaks of haemorrhagic fever were found
associated with mortality rates in the range of 53% in
Uganda (Outbreak of Ebola haemorrhagic fever, Uganda,
August 2000–January 2001, 2001) to 81% in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Ebola hemorragic
fever, Congo—Update, 2003). It must be stressed,
however, that with these agents the transmission of the
responsible agents requires close physical exposure to
infected blood and other bodily ﬂuids and that, in most
cases, patients in the period of high infectivity are too sick
to travel.
SARS indicates a great potential for rapid international
spread under favorable conditions such as those created by
the density of international travels. Data available so far
(Preliminary clinical description of severe acute respira-
tory syndrome, 2003) indicate that the incubation period
should vary from 1 to 11 days, allowing the infectious
agent to be transported, unsuspected and undetected, in an
asymptomatic air traveller throughout the world. On the
other hand, interpersonal transmission through close
contact with respiratory secretions associated with a lack
of knowledge of the precise initial symptoms led to a
concentration of cases in previously healthy hospital staff
and an alarming proportion of patients requiring intensive
care. The economic losses due to SARS have already been
substantial in S.E. Asia and should SARS continue to
spread, will have a global effect.
Prompt identiﬁcation of suspect cases is critical in the
deﬁnition of emerging infectious diseases. In order to
achievethisgoal,theCDCestablishedin1994anemerging
infections program (EIP), aimed at receiving reports from
physicians on potential unexplained deaths (or admission)
due to possibly infectious causes. This project, together
with an effort to strengthen global surveillance (including
prompt reporting, adequate laboratory capacity, and the
expertise to be mobilized quickly across national
boundaries to follow disease movements) as also provided
bytheGlobalOutbreakAlertandResponseNetworkbythe
WHO, is of obvious importance in the challenge provided
by SARS and all emerging diseases (even those derived
from terroristic threats).
At the present time, it is impossible to foresee the
outcome of this global emergency. Will the outbreaks be
contained and prevented from becoming an endemic
infection in human populations, or will they assume a
cyclic pattern, thus reappearing again in the same or in
another geographical area in the future? An RT-PCR assay
for the identiﬁcation of the agent, an ELISA assay for the
detection of acute and convalescent serum titers against
the Coronavirus agent, and a method to culture the
etiologic agent have been established, Chemotherapeutic
agents are currently being screened for their potential anti-
Coronavirus effects and a potential animal model for
vaccine testing is in progress. In a world where all national
borders are permeable to microbial agents, we are
reminded of a quote from the American poet Wallace
Stevens, who stated, at the beginning of the 20th century,
that thought is an infection and in the case of certain
thoughts, it becomes an epidemic.
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